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Biology
202
2001 Third Web Report
On Serendip
Morality's Biological Nature:
Implications for the Attribution of "Good" and
"Evil".
Ingrid Solano
"A man who has no assured and ever present belief in the
existence of a personal God or of a future existence with retribution
and reward, can have for his rule of life, as far as I can see, only
to follow those impulses and instincts which are the strongest or
which seem to him the best ones. . . . If he acts for the good of
others, he will receive the approbation of his fellow men and gain
the love of those with whom he lives." - Charles Darwin
In my last paper "Serial Killers: Just trying to feel normal,
it's not my fault"
(4) I addressed the question
as to whether biology can make us murderers. In my paper I catalogued
multiple instances in which biology seems to consistently differ
between 'normal' people and individuals who have been dubbed the most
immoral, inhuman and evil predators of society. Though I found many
biological differences between the normal brain and the murderer's
brain, it was not necessarily explained that 'morality' is a common,
biologically based aspect of human behavior. The nature of my prior
paper was to ascertain whether there is a difference in our brain
from that of a killer, but in this paper I explore the biological
function of 'morality' and its natural occurrence in the catalogue of
human behaviors. Discussing 'morality' as a phenomenon that is
inherent in humans will then allow the further exploration of the
implications of deviation from this 'norm'. Can these individuals be
labeled as 'evil' and be held accountable for their behavior?
As the former paper posed implications pertaining to the
'accountability' of a murderer, this paper proposes that these
individuals have strayed from the underlying foundation of human
nature that allows us to impose even the conscious and subjective
qualities of 'accountability' (what is necessary in order to apply
labels like 'good' and 'evil'). Being unfettered by these qualities
of natural understanding and the willfull/conscious qualities
necessary to use these labels, this paper proposes that not only are
these individuals incapable of being called 'evil', but that their
deeds are 'less wrong' than those individuals who do not have
biological deficits in the 'moral norm'. Lacking this 'moral norm',
these individuals are incapable of knowing the anxiety caused by
guilt. In fact, these individuals are in a state of ignorance as to
the 'intentional' nature of 'good and evil'. The biological deficits
found in my prior paper cause these murderers to be individuals who
commit their acts without the intent to cause distress/harm with the
full faculties of emotion and understanding of their victim's state
of victimization. How can we punish those who do not understand what
they have done is 'wrong'?
Can one truly be "evil" without being cognizant of one's
deviance and without the socially expected 'evil intentions' and 'ill
will' that one automatically assigns with the very word 'evil'? In
fact, is there something "less wrong" about the acts of
these individuals who have been biologically impaired? This is
particularly important to discover because noting these biological
differences in the immoral and criminal brain makes punishment and
treatment of these individuals a difficult situation. It was
suggested in my former paper that perhaps the 'accountability' of
serial killers might be able to be determined by brain-scans. Finding
the biological differences may define who understands 'morality', and
who does not. Would this indicate the existence of an immoral act
where the individual who commits it is unconscious of their 'evil'
intentions, and thus may not actually be committing an 'evil' act?
(4). Without the knowledge of being 'wrong', is it fair
to consider an individual 'evil'?
Even the 'insanity defense' clearly states that we can not punish a
person who does not understand what they have done as being wrong.
Indeed, changes or abnormalities in the brain indicate that serial
killers do not understand the world as you or I. If morality is
inherently a biologically based aspect of human behavior, then the
abnormalities discovered in my former paper offer murderers (as well
as a wide range of other individuals who are considered 'immoral') a
crutch of unaccountability for their acts. These individuals may
simply be impaired and 'hard-wired' incorrectly, in such a way that
they do not fall into a category of 'evil' or 'wrong', but into a
category of 'less wrong', and even 'unfortunate' individuals who have
been denied the ability to empathize with others and understand the
inherently (and mandatory) intentional natures of 'good' and 'evil'
behaviors. As science begins to unravel personality, accountability
unravels with it. "The person becomes his parts - some working,
some defective through no fault of his own."
(4)
"Morality is as firmly grounded in neurobiology as anything else
we do or are," said de Waal
(6). Morality must
be seen as a state that is available to our species as a whole, and
thus the biological impairment of not having morality would be seen
as what allows us to throw off the drastic label of 'evil' for he who
has impairment. The idea that morality might be a biological trait in
the human nature dates even back to the father of evolution. In The
Descent of Man, Charles Darwin addressed the development of a moral
sense from a naturalistic perspective
(1). He
implies that 'morality' could have arisen as a consequence of human
beings' biological and social characteristics. This would imply that
it is perfectly natural, if not expected and 'normal', to exhibit the
desire to act kindly toward others, and to try to see the world as
they might see it.
It is implied that any animal endowed with well-marked social
instincts (including parental and filial affections) would inevitably
acquire a moral sense or conscience as soon as its intellectual
powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man.
Social instincts supposedly led an animal to take pleasure in the
society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with
them, and to perform various services for them. These services may be
of a definite and evidently instinctive nature; or there may be only
a wish and readiness, as with most of the higher social animals, to
aid their fellows in certain general ways. Natural selection would
seem to select for species who 'care for' their young, in that those
species who are more inclined to protect their progeny are more
likely to have progeny that survive
(1).
My former paper reports many instances of brain differences that can
change the behaviors of a man. In the famous example of Phineas Gage,
an accident at his job caused an iron rod to pierce through Gage's
skull. Gage was able to stand and speak a few moments later. His
intelligence was intact, but it soon became clear that this once
model young man had been changed by the incident. He now cursed, lied
and behaved horribly to people around them. Gage's doctor, John
Harlow, said that Gage was no longer Gage, and that the balance
"between his intellectual faculty and his animal
propensities" had been destroyed. Can this example of
brain-injury be used to explain the 'animal propensities' of
murderers and the immoral?
(4). My last paper
implied that it could be, but how can it be used as evidence for a
natural biological foundation for 'morality'?
De Waal also uses Gage as an example for showing how morality is
grounded in neurobiology, and since human brains are a product of
evolution, evolution must be a part of any satisfactory account of
morality. de Wall outlines Darwinian dilemmas of pairing natural
selection and morality. He argues that incorporating a social context
into the biological explanation will answer these problems and
explain how social interactions of morality can be attributed to
evolution.
(2). De Waal theorizes that human
morality arose from the simple need to get along in order to survive.
Already well-known for extensive research on how monkeys and apes
reconcile after conflict, de Waal is now studying morality in their
system of tit-for-tat sharing. De Waal's evidence of 'morality' in an
animal model is a compelling piece of evidence for a moral biological
foundation. De Waal is perhaps the most well known source regarding
the pairing of morality with biology in an evolutionary psychology
perspective
(7).
A compelling example of attributing morality to biology is a study of
two patients who incurred prefrontal lesions before the age of 16
months. Both children appeared to make excellent recoveries, but as
they grew older, they began to display behavioral problems even more
severe than is typical for those with adult lesions of supposedly
'moral' based portions of the brain. These behaviors included
stealing, lying, verbal and physical abuse of other people, poor
parenting of their illegitimate children, lack of remorse, and
failure to make plans for their own futures. There were no obvious
environmental explanations for their behavior; both children grew up
in stable middle-class families and had siblings who were socially
well-adjusted
(3). de Waal claims that it seemed
"as if the moral compass of these people had been demagnetised,
causing it to spin out of control"
(7). De Waal
claimed that this incident provided examples of how conscience is not
some disembodied concept that can be understood only on the basis of
culture and religion. The cultural and religious implications of
'good' and 'evil' will find it difficult to label individuals who are
incapable of comprehending 'morality' due to aspects of biology that
govern the creation of the very concept of 'morality'.
The typical figure in literature and history that comes to mind as
being 'evil' is the dark, violent, conscienceless person who commits
acts for his own benefit and enjoyment. However, biological
differences in the violent individual whom we see as bloodthirsty and
fiending for the causation of pain in others suddenly forces us to
see this person in a new light. The intentional focus of negative,
inhumane behavior (what we consider to be the necessary structure of
attributing the label 'evil' to) is suddenly attributed to a
disturbance in a biologically based 'moral function'. The person
should now be considered an individual who is stricken with a deficit
that has denied them the capability of feeling and interpreting their
actions like the rest of us can. Can we truly consider this person
'evil', or is he suffering from an affliction that has caused him to
remain in the state of an unempathic child? This paper implies the
former theory.
In conclusion, this paper implied that murderers and other
morally-deviant individuals with biological differences aren't
capable of being considered 'evil' due to the biological nature of
their deficit. Due to these findings of neurobiology, and the
deviance from the inherent, biological function of 'morality', there
is an intrinsic new category of being 'less wrong'. This 'less wrong'
is based upon the inability to attribute the inherent aspect of
'consciousness' and 'intention' that is needed to consider an
individual 'accountable' for their acts. This consciousness,
intention, and accountability is necessary for labeling things as
'good or evil'. The biological differences were explored in my former
paper while this paper intended to imply that 'morality' and thus the
feeling (and understanding/application) of 'guilt' is inherent in
human nature. It is a biological malfunction in this natural
social-behavioral 'function' called morality that would imply an
inability to be labeled 'evil'. Individuals with these deviances are
not any more guilty (or cognitively aware of the causes of their
deviance) for their actions as those individuals with other cognitive
deficits that cause behaviors like clumsiness or language
disabilities (like those attributed to 'autism' or any sort of brain
injury).
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