Biology 202 |
Thinking about the behavior of quadraplegics, as we started to do on Thursday, suggests that Dickinson (and several of your suggestions) may indeed be right: that the self is not only contained within the nervous system but is in fact "smaller" than the nervous system. The relevant points are that input to the nervous system and outputs from it can occur without the person experiencing either. What do you think of this set of observations and the interpretations placed on it? of the notion of an "I-function" as a box within the nervous system? What implications/questions follow from it?
As always, you're free to write about anything that struck you as interesting this week (and to write more than once, if you're inclined, as several did last week). If you'd like some incentive, how about this:
Thinking about the behavior of quadraplegics, as we started to do on Thursday, suggests that Dickinson (and several of your suggestions) may indeed be right: that the self is not only contained within the nervous system but is in fact "smaller" than the nervous system. The relevant points are that input to the nervous system and outputs from it can occur without the person experiencing either. What do you think of this set of observations and the interpretations placed on it? of the notion of an "I-function" as a box within the nervous system? What implications/questions follow from it?
If this is true and he can't voluntarily move his legs, then when his physical therapists work with him to keep the muscles fit in his legs, they move his legs around with their arms. I don't know if this makes sense, I guess I am confused as to how much his leg will move if provoked (pinched). It seems a little counterintuitive, to say he can move his leg (not that he is moving it)when he is paralyzed.
The other issue that we dealt with was the I-box which makes a lot of sense. Maybe our bodies and all of the sympathetic/parasympathetic nerves are mainly important to tell our bodies to perform tasks and react to stimuli, but when these nerves are disconnected from the brain it doesn't affect who we are. That is really important, our mind and soul is exclusively located somewhere within our brain and even with an injury as severe as Reeves(where he can't breath without help)he still has his beliefs and still is able to dream within his mind. All that is different is that he doesn't have control of his body, but he still has his body.
It seems that the I-box has to be at the rostral end of the brain and that it is always intact when someone is alive, no matter how much of their body they cannot control. I think this has a strong relation to Emily Dickinsons poem, that the mind is bigger that anything but it is enclosed within the brain and that is behaviour.
Now I have an additional question. Can Christopher Reeves arm move if pinched? I was thinking that maybe it can't because his sensory nerves, for his arm, are located above where the spinal cord was cut. How far up his body, will his sensory nerves work?
This argument takes on a different tone when considering the idea of a brain that exists apart from the body it controls. The consequences of severing the spinal cord seem to me to provide evidence for the existence of some governing entity outside of neural connections. Take the example from class the other day: that a sensory input cannot be processed such that it results in a subsequent motor response does not preclude the activity or awareness of the self. Indeed, life as we define it is not medically considered over until brain death occurs, indicating an established if scientifically elusive respect for the existence of whatever constitutes the self in relation to the its location in the brain. Many belief systems contend that life continues after physical death; furthermore, many individuals who may not subscribe to any such specific doctrine entertain the notion that some aspect of the person "lives on" after their body has given up, even if only in memory.
As complex and expansive as the nervous system is, I personally still have a problem accepting it all as an evolutionary accident. I am not one to follow a particular faith, and would much more quickly assign myself to the category of scientist than idealist. However, I seem to have a difficult time wrapping my mind around the idea that electrical activity results in the more abstract I, that exists as me, as a person, as only I can exist. What is it that constitutes me? Should I define myself in terms of what I am or who I am? Can one exist without the other? I know, in that I have been taught, that changes within the nervous system directly result in changes in behavior. I can explain to you how an action potential works and what it accomplishes. But I cannot explain to you why there is an "I" in the first place that can know that. Maybe someone else will have a better hold on this concept than I do.
As for Christopher Reeve, I also have followed his injury since I also horseback ride. (As an aside note, he was an inexperienced rider who was on a course that was too difficult for him. He shouldn't have been on the course in the first place. But that is neither here nor there.) I don't think that his "self" has changed because only the connections to the motor neurons were severed. His underlying personality is still there because there was no brain leision.
My understanding of his injury is that he can move his legs and arms when pinched because it is a reflex. Reflexs take place in the spinal cord so there is no need for the signal to have to travel to the brain in order for the brain to give the command to move away from the source of pain. So he may not be able to say "that hurts" but he will move his arms or legs away from the painful stimulus. He can't say "that hurts" becuase it would mean that the stimulus would have to be able travel to the part of the brain that interprets information from pain receptors. Since the connections between the spinal cord and the brain are cut the stimulus cannot get to the brain.
Those who experience phantom limbs are quite certain that the part of their body which has been removed continues to exist as part of their self. They suffer pain ranging from cramping to burning, as well as sensations like tickling or wetness. They "know" that their limbs continue to exist in certain positions (often awkward ones), even when the stump of the limb is visible in front of their eyes. Some theories suggest that the nerve endings in the remaining parts of limbs are continuing to fire and transmit signals to the brain. A problem with this theory is the existence of phantom limbs is para or quadrapalegics, like Christopher Reeve. There is no way for sensory signals from these areas to reach the brain due to the severed spinal cord. Therefore, the sensations of pain in phantom limbs must be generated by the brain itself. The _Scientific American_ article goes through some interesting theories attempting to explain this.
For our discussion of brain=behavior and the "I" function, phantom limbs bring up some interesting points. Amputees with phantom limb sensations are perceiving that part of their body, long since removed, still remains; it is part of their self. In this case the inputs and the outputs are not possible (?) but still continue to exist for the individual. Is this the work of the "I" function? Is an awareness of the body the responsibility of the brain or the mind? The brain is generating behaviors (some sufferers of phantom limb feel that their legs/arms are constantly moving and therefore fatigued) which are no longer physically possible, but are very real to those experiencing them.
I feel that I have a long way to go before I can understand or accept the idea of "I" existing as a function of a "box" within the brain. I believe that the brain does play a major role in the idea of "self," but with problems like phantom limbs, where the brain and the self seem to be at odds over something as simple as awareness of one's body, the topic seems, at best, a bit gray.
Another question that arises from all of this is whether the significance of one's "self" becomes less significant if one considers it to be a mere part of the brain, and not all of one's being. Is it reasonable to expect humans to temper their behavior based on the idea that all that they experience is not all that happens to them? Can that thought really be understood? Can the "self," as overpowering as it is, ever believe that it is nothing more than purely biological? It seems the consideration would be abhorrent to the I-function.
This discussion does raise two interesting questions. 1) What does it mean that we as humans do not use most of our brains? 2) What happens to the "I-function" to someone that is in a coma or is described as a vegetable?
What I am curious about are those people who claim to have an out of body experience or those that have died and come back and say that they saw themselves dead. I know that I have never personally had this experience, but if these things really do happen, can they be controlled by something contained within a physical being. I know that thoughts and emotions and dreams are all abstract things and they are controlled by something that seems to be physical or contained within something physical, but there is so much out there that we can't seem to explain. As I said before, the problem I have it that it is hard for me to believe that something as small as the nervous system can contain everything that defines who we are and what we will be. Can something physical define us? Is it someting physical at all? I am questioning the whole notion.
This shows that the body does not necessary need an I-box in the to try to keep out of danger; it will do it reflexively. The “I” in fact, tends to override the reflexes, evident when you carry a hot casserole dish from the oven to the table without pulling your hands back and dropping it. So Christopher Reeve is in the brain and not diffused throughout they body. If he was, then severing the spinal cord would have some effect on his behavior but he would still be in control of most of his bodily functions.
It would appear that Dickinson is correct in saying that the mind is contained within the brain. The damage done on Christopher Reeves body did not affect his mental behavior; he is still the same person he was before the accident. But the connection between himself and the body he controls is severed and therefore he can not behave physically, the same as before. If the connections between Christopher Reeve and his body could be fixed and reconnected, then he would once again be able to do whatever his had done before the accident without any difficults.
The mind has such a broad range of functions that I do not think it could be contained in something the size of a ball. The mind is extrememly complex and I don't think we will ever fully understand the way it works.
How do the mind and brain work together to make us who we are? How big of a role does the brain itself play? What else factors in to make each of us unique human beings?
The brain is changing and so are the demands of the I-box. The environment is changing, so are the responses of the I-box. To say that “personality”, or the behavior we associate with the activity of the I-box, is exempt from the physical and external experiences of an individual paints a rather hopeless picture (perhaps this is why Dickinson killed herself). The project of psychological rehabilitation rests on the belief that the I-box can change, and does change as a result of experience. To deny this fact would be to dismiss the feats of abused children and reformed criminals. At any rate, I believe that for this reason, the I-box of Christopher Reeves pre-accident is different from the I-box of Christopher Reeves post accident (I also believe that the I-box of Christopher Reeves when he is hungry is different than the I-box of Christopher Reeves when he is sad, explanation to follow). I could argue that the issue of control itself changes Reeves relationship with his body and environment, and therefore the nature of his I-box. Or I could argue that because the I-box is inexplicably connected to the nervous system, which changed as a result of the accident, his I-box also changed. Either way, the change is the result of a different relationship between the brain, the body and the environment. Point being, change the environment, change the body, change the brain, or any combination of the three, and you have changed the I-box of the individual.
From the vantagepoint of the “fence” the neuro-bio-philosopher can assert that the self is both a concept and a structure. Conceptually, the self is that which initiates response—the system or structure or chemical that communicates reception to perception to action. As a structure, the self is the box responsible for these activities. When we are making decisions our I-box is commanding the activities of the frontal lobe. When we are overwhelmed with nostalgia this box is working through the hippocampus. Therefore the project of understanding the activities and changes of the I-box is the project of understanding the brain.
How do we know that neural imaging isn't the new phrenology? Gall seemed to have many confident supporters back in the last century. Gall was attempting to tie together how the nervous system functions and how that can be translated into observable behavior. While today we credit him with localization of function, historically phrenology is recieved as somewhat of a joke. Are PET scans the same thing? Is blood flow truly an indicator of attention and activation or is it the same as linking bumps on the head to particular behaviors? I guess it comes down to what activity and activation are. I don't know and am not convinced that those pictures I see of blood flow and neuronal firing are difinitivly linked to activation in that part of the brain. Obviously, I am not a neuronal imaging specialist, this is just something I've always been skeptical of and reading that article made me even more skeptical. Phrenology used to be a revolution and now its a joke. Will PET scans someday be the phrenology of the future?
So what? How does this support the "brain = behavior" theory and the "I-function"? Well, it seems to me that a critical element of self and thus of behavior is our perceptions, our experiences, our senses. What we see, hear, touch and taste must shape who we are. If you pinch Christopher Reeves’ toe he retracts it but he doesn’t FEEL it because he has severed the connection between his brain and the rest of his nervous system. If Christopher Reeves had felt you pinch his toe it might effect his behavior--he might stay away from you, or wear shoes when you were around. If these two instances are reflective of the brain’s connection to our other sensory perceptions, then I think it could be argued that brain equals behavior. Whether there is nothing else I’m not sure how to determine.
I have a question about hypnotism. Does a hypnotist hyponotize the "I" or just gains control of the person's nervous system, controlling behavior? If brain equals behavior is true, then all the hyponotist has to do is somehow gain control of the brain. Since the hypnotist doesn't do any form of brain surgery, it doesn't support the brain equalling behavior theory. But if there is a mind, brain, and soul a hyponotists would have to gain control over all three entities to control behavior. I don't know, I guess it all depends on the way you identify you- physically, abstractly, or a combination of the two.
Neurons are found in the frog, the leech, etc. - and the layout of their nervous systems is even similar to ours (but more simplistic, of course, and without the neocortex) - so what is it that makes us human? I'd have to say it is the so-called "I-box", which, to me, doesn't necessarily have to be an enclosed structure (or a material structure, for that matter). It resides inside the brain, and could derive from all of the signaling activity and communication going on in there.
My question is: how does the I-box relate to consciousness? IS it consciousness (or an inner awareness of yourself and the world around you)? Or is consciousness an even smaller "box" within the I-box? What else is going on inside this I-box? Do emotions reside here as well? What about language?
For further reading on these issues, and just about any others that have come up in class, check out the MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. There are topic indexes for linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, and related fields of study...I found the articles to be really helpful. They're brief yet in-depth and to the point, and each one also links up to related websites and other entries. The link to the encyclopedia is also on our Course Web Resources list. Hope this is of interest to some of you!
What is interesting me now, are people with psychological disorders such as split or multiple personality disorder. Have their "I" boxes been divided into parts? Is something "clogging" up the input and output channels? If the "I" function is what makes us behave as individuals, then what's going on in people who behave like more than one?
Well, I certainly am confused -- a sure sign of progress! I confess I haven't yet read all the other postings, but so far, I'm unclear on just what we mean by the "I-function." Are we talking about an actual self or just a sense of self? (Actually, I probably shouldn't say "just" a sense of self, since that may well be a more important determinant of behavior than an actual self.) It is easier to accept that a sense of self is contained in the brain; this, I thought, is closer to what was meant by an "I-function." After all, this is what Christopher Reeves would be talking about if he were to say, "I did not move my foot," even if his foot were to draw back from a painful stimulus. He doesn't mean that he didn't move his foot, he means that the part of him that he perceives as himself didn't move his foot. It makes perfect sense that this perception would be housed in the same part of the nervous system as other higher-order perceptions.
Whether this sense of self can be extended to an actual self -- with all of its theological and metaphysical implications -- is of course trickier. In part, it depends on who gets to define the self. I think it's fair to say that most of us are accustomed to thinking of the self as defined by the self, but it's not clear to me that that's accurate. Christopher Reeves may say, "I didn't move my foot," but the rest of us would surely say (at least in typical conversation, which is the same context as Mr. Reeves' presumed statement), "Christopher Reeves moved his foot." Who's right?
Other similar examples can be seen in behaviors under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or even psychoactive medications. It's common for someone under these influences to say that such behaviors "aren't me -- it's the drugs" (or in reverse in the case of mental illness, "it's not me -- it's the illness"), even though observers would most likely say that it was this person. Again, who's right?
I suppose this answer in turn depends on the purpose of defining a self. I define Christopher Reeves to describe how I observe him as a part of the world, whereas Christopher Reeves defines Christopher Reeves to describe how he interacts with the world. It's a fundamental split -- for both of us -- between "me" and "everything else." So my subject line is relevant after all (hooray!): "I" is the most commonly used word in spoken English because our language reflects our perception of the world.
This is the part where I try to bring all this back onto topic. I think my point is that an actual self can't be defined solely by a sense of self because how others define us is as valid a description of our interaction with the world as how we define ourselves. By this line of reasoning (and I have pointedly avoided issues of theology and metaphysics), an actual self is not contained within the brain's I-function, only the sense of self.
i'm also thinking of the boy with autism with whom i used to do therapy. the way his therapists described his problem to me was that his brain was fine and his body/motor skills were in tact, but the connections between them were in need of strengthening. if i asked him to make his mouth into a circle by asking him to imitate me, he would try to do it, but would often not be able to do it. if by chance his mouth formed the correct, we would give him rewards and he understood the rewards. through this reward system, we were able to strenthen the connections of his mind to his body, but otherwise those connections would remain unconnected. i'm just wondering how his "i-box" works differently than people who do not have autism. some part of it is there, he enjoys doing things, he finds joy in computer games and toys, and he is able to walk around and dance, but his mind is not able to tell his body to do certain things without the help of the reward system. and what of the people with parkinsons disease? i'm thinking specifically of those people from the movie "frozen addicts" that some of you may have seen if you've taken behavioral neuroscience with earl thomas. they were indeed frozen; they were not able to move. but if someone yelled "fire" their bodies were able to run across the hall, but when asked to move of their own will, they were unable to do so.
A child is not born with a personality. Instead, this personality ("I function") develops as the child grows in response to stimuli. This has been a subject of conversation within the scientific field recently in regard to the issue of cloning. If we were to create two babies, each with the exact same genetic code, they would develop into two different people because of their differing responses to their environments. This implies that the mind (ie, the "I function") cannot exist without the brain.
The "I function" must be able to influence the nervous system. Personal will can overcome a nervous response. For example, if one were to hold a hot plate, the nervous response would be to immediately let go of the plate. However, a person can force himself to hold onto the plate despite the pain.
What would we be like if there were no such thing as the "I function" (ie, the mind)? Without the ability to think and feel - - which must be the functions of the mind since we all do so differently although our nervous systems are very much the same - - the brain could exist, but it would have no real purpose. The body would be alive, but the person himself (ie, his personality) would not.
Yes, I know that sentence sounds strange considering the I-function is supposed to be consciousness. But couldn't it be possible to have different levels of consciousness? I'm not talking about the super-ego and all that but maybe something more discreet. I was talking with an acupuncturist-in-training recently who told me that the body holds on to physical memories of experience. For instance, sometimes people who receive accupuncture treatments experience old physical or emotional reactions to drugs taken years ago. While the drug is no longer chemically reacting in this person's brain, the sensation is very real, supposedley because the stimulation activated the same part of the brain that the old drug had.
The manifestation of psycho-somatic symptoms and stress reactions also may provide some support for a subtle consciousness. How does one explain the adverse effects of mental anguish and stress on the physical body if he/she can't accept the possibility of the body and consciousness interacting in ways that aren't discernable by the "I" of here and now? And how exactly is a stressful life situation translated into a biological response such as a headache or an ulcer?
To get back on track though, I realize that in Christopher Reeve's case, the connection between his self and sensory system was severed so that the I no longer had access to the sensation. But why does this have to diminish the capacity, or size of the self? I think paralysis is an acknowledgement to the structure of part of what the self deals with, in this case pain sensations. Can't the consciousness still involve a labyrinth of associations, some of which possibly even transcend our immediate experience of awareness? To sum this up, I guess I'm saying that I think the I-function is not a just a component of a bigger box, but a more complicated keystone.
For someone who has never really thought about neurobiology actively I am still grappling with questions like “brain=behaviour” and defining brain and mind. These questions seem all the more ambiguous as I try to place the “I” function among them. I’m not sure if I accept the “I.” If the “I” is a central system that responds and defines behavior can we say that the “I” becomes disengaged from an individual or stops to exist? Or is it that the “I” changes rather than disengage with every experience in life? Something like the “I” adapting to various situations one finds themselves in. If this is true I'm not sure I believe the "I" to be defined at any one particular place. To me it seems that if the "I" is so holistic than perhaps it is larger than the mind.
In class, it was stated that Christopher Reeves is not really Christopher Reeves from his neck to toe(?) because the connections from his spinal cord to his brain were interupted; and that he is only himself in the head because he can sense and react to instances that usually involve the medulla or midbrain (like hearing, tasting, seeing, thinking). Can this be applied and be true for people with amnesia--who claim to not remember, thus considered to be different people? The issue here is, is a person with amnesia really a different person, since he/she has no concept of oneself? Is a person with amnesia exempt from going to prison for committing crimes...since he/she wasn't considered to be the same person when the crime was committed? John Locke would say that a person with amnesia is not the same person because his/her mind would not exist in the same nature of existence (or something like that). What makes a person who one is? If Christopher Reeves had lost an arm or something, would we say "a body has lost an arm" or would we say "Christopher Reeves has lost an arm"? Thus, is Christopher Reeves exempt from being himself where nerves have been interupted? But then again, there's that whole issue with "phantom limbs" which I found very fascinating.
I had made this suggestion in my comments for the first week of class, as a potential means of explaining the "missing element" from brain=behavior. In retrospect, especially considering the example of Christopher Reeves, as well as the "I-box" discussed in class, I would to have to say that while I remain intrigued by the notion, I want to tweak my views a little. Obviously, I would agree with the "mind" concept, or the idea of the self being contained within the nervous system. In considering the example given in class considering Reeves, I feel relatively convinced that this mind or I-box functions within the brain (reason: severed connections result in loss of "communication" between conscious awareness and physical action). What is interesting about the example with Reeves is that an action occurs without this "central command" being aware. Initially, I thought that this finding disproved my theory entirely; afterall, if the body can react without the mind, then there must be some stimuli that don't pass by the brain, which i consider the central processing station of the body. In considering further, though, I realized that the more powerful suggestion made by the case of Reeves is that some actions don't require the "consent" of the brain. This idea is one that I can deal with, I think, though it necessitates an alteration of my first thought that all perception was processed in the brain. I can't say that I remember the specifics of The Wizard of Oz well enough to know if there were any defense systems that were like reflexes, but I can see it as a "first-line" of action, and therefore potentially compatible with my model. As long as we maintain our definition of brain as the central nervous system, then brain can also still equal behavior.
The next question at hand is the issue of the particular physiological arrangement of the I-box within the nervous system or beyond the nervous system. Others have commented that they have difficulty perceiving the I-box as a component of the brain because its capabilities are of a higher nature. My theory is that the mind is probably not a structure within the brain, but rather the result of the interactions within it. I feel like this discussion almost unavoidably leads to questions concerning the soul and its existence. However, I don't feel like my explanation necessarily involves an intangible aspect such as the common definition of of the soul. In trying to "think out of the box" (no pun intended), this idea is the only one that I can come up with. Somehow, it seems incongruent that the mind would physically exist within the brain (in this case, specifically the brain within one's skull), despite the fact that I am relatively convinced that whatever the form the mind comes from, its interactions or location or whatever is in the skull. So...I guess my theory is that the "mind" is the convergence of many many many interactions within the brain. It's awareness because it is the center of all of the processes for perception. I know this seems a little farfetched, but it's just a thought.... let me know what you all think, too, about this idea....
However, I am not totally convinced that everything that constitutes an individual is dependent upon the nervous system. Sure, our emotions, our behavior, etc. all depend on the it, and furthermore, all that we learn in life is experienced through the nervous system, whether it be visual, auditory, or sensory learning. However, I still believe that a person's mind need not be contained inside a box. Many debates have been going on for some time whether a person's soul could possibly be contained in something as finite as the nervous system, and this I admit is difficult to prove by science or even explain. However, I believe that in the grand scheme of things, we humans have only been on the earth for a few seconds. There are billions of things we still do not know, regarding behavior, etc. We believe science is the truth, but only because it seems to give us seemingly consistent patterns we don't completely understand but regard as the final truth since it is given to us empirically. I'm not 100% sure where I'm going with this, but it should be obvious I still don't completely believe in the "I box" theory - at least, yet.
If I think of the "self" or the "I-function" as the sensations which one experiences, then it would follow that the self is contained within the nervous system. The nervous system enables the existence of a self, and when the nervous system is damaged, as in Christopher Reeves, part of the self is lost. The part that is lost, though, seems to be only physical sensation, and is that really all a self is?
I would like to think that I am actually not a tangible thing. I feel that whom I am is actually immaterial. I am just some energy or something like that. When I die, I would like to think that I am not actually dying. Perhaps I have just read too many supermarket tabloids filled with tales of people having out of body or near death experiences where they can step out of themselves. I cannot easily accept the notion that "I" am a part of my body. I think that science and the truth are always changing, and right now perhaps the idea of an "I" box makes sense, but this can change. After all, not so long ago, people thought the world was flat and the universe revolved around Earth.
Christopher Reeve and other quadraplegics must lead very frustrating lives. They still have thoughts and desires to behave and move, but the connections between the brain and the rest of the body that allow freedom of movement are no longer functional. I believe the separate I-function box theory and the lack of connections between the brain and body should be seen as two separate things. It is clear that quadraplegics still behave--they dream, they produce facial expressions, they think.... All of these behaviors use different parts of the brain that are interconnected. So, how could the I-function possibly exist in just one place?
This neurologist at the UC San Diego has began to treat his patients who have sensations in their amputated limb with mirrors. His aim to "trick" the brain into changing its body image. He found that the body maps of these patients had been transferred to other parts of their bodies. One man felt the doctor touching his missing hand, when he was really just stroking his cheek. And the man could also sense his missing arm when it was really just the stump being stimulated.
The doctor decided to see if he could take this knowledge and help out his patients who felt paralysis in their phantom limbs. By placing a mirror sideways in front of the patient, so that so that they saw a reflection of their good arm where the phantom was. Many of his patients have benefited from this therapy. Some have been able to shift their paralyzed phantom arms back into more comfortable positons, while a few have even been able to make his phantom limb disappear completely.
This example seems to prove in some ways that brain does in fact equal behavior. Patients may feel sensations or pain of phantom limbs because the brain has not adjusted to the fact that it no longer exists. The brain is still sending signals to the now non-existent motor neurons and seems to be receiving signals from the missing sensory neurons. But the success of mirror therapy seems to indicate that the brain may be able to retrain itself into readjusting its own view of the body.
Another example....when someone pokes my tummy, I kind of squeak. This seems like a reflex behavior in me, something that bypasses the brain, as I can't really help it unless I'm anticipating it. However, not everybody exhibits this reflex, and what differentiates me from a nonsqueaker, I would assume, is at least somewhat related to personality or temperament, and so must lie in the I-function somehow. (This difference in reflexes between people is also evident in some people being particularly "jumpy", and more likely than other people to exhibit a startle reflex if you sneak up on them from behind, for example.) But if the I-function is in or related to the brain, and the brain is not involved in this reflex behavior, how does the I-function mediate this behavior? Has my I-function somehow preprogrammed my muscles or the spinal cord neurons that do not involve the brain to make this response? Somehow my "I" seems to have infiltrated places where it has no business being, if it can affect a signal that doesn't go to my brain.
"I" came up with the idea that "I" is "awareness of being a certain alteration of amazing matter", an awareness of the experiences of my organism's individual behavior, emotions, and reasoning (which are all functions of the nervous system). The existence of free which would allow for infinite behavioral possibilites would perhaps connect the "I" to another level of definition. But does free will exist? Or are our choices limited to our neuron possibilities?
Some random thoughts about "I" 1)What are the evolutionary reasons for"I"? 2) Dogs definitely know you. Do they and all other mammals have an "I"? Do starfish have an "I"? 3) The "I" gets so big during adolescence.
Why are we aware of ourselves?
These are a few highlights of the article:
An addict's brain is both physically and chemically different from a normal brain due to the fact that drugs such as heroin, nicotine, and amphetamines cause changes in the nerves related to pleasure. Persistent use of druges will cause long-term changes to nerves, which reflects the fact that users must increase his dose of drugs over time.
Drug users have deep-rooted memories of their use, which scientifically explains why they have such a hard time kicking the habit. "And just as Pavlov's dog learned to salivate when he heard a bell that meant 'chow time,' so an addict begins to crave his drug when he sees, hears or smells a reminder of past use."
I like Avis Brennan's idea that there is a 'core' we are born with, which places constraints on our cognitive functions and starts to forge relationships -- the idea of plasticity of the brain up to a certain age. However, this core seems to be more of an 'instinct' (Steven Pinker wrote a wonderful book, 'The Language Instinct', where he argues that part of language is innate -- that there is a 'core', which kind of ties into this idea).
However, I don't want to think of the 'I'-function as an instinct, and have a tendency to believing that it develops more through experience instead of being an 'entity' we are born with.
But I think the idea of plasticity and the forging of connections between different parts of the brain is extremely important in this. Karen Munoz mentioned therapy with an autistic boy where the goal was to strengthen the connection between 'mind' and motor skills. Building on this idea of connection from the 'I'-function to the rest of our functions, we know that injury to different functions influences 'who we are' to different degrees. Christopher Reeves seems to have kept his personality (except for indirect effects on self confidence etc?), on the other hand we would not be as likely to say the same about Phinneas Gage. So a possible conclusion might be that the connections between whatever constitutes the 'I'-function and say the frontal lobe are stronger than the connections between other functions that would not influence personality to such an extent if injured. (?)
It seems to me that the I-function is like the body's and mind's accountant. It evaluates inputs from the organs, muscles, and brain and is the summation of who the person is. Phinneas Gage's personality completely changed because his I-function was no longer receiving input from his frontal lobes (because of the damage done there). We know that certain parts of the brain such as the frontal lobes and the amygdala have a profound influence on personality while the spinal cord does not (explaining why Christopher Reeve's personality didn't change). To me, this doesn't mean that the I-function has a stronger connection to any one part of the body. Instead, I see the I-function as encompassing many different things and that's why damage or injury to a specific part of the body leads to a specific change in behavior.
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