Biology 202 Neurobiology and Behavior Spring 2002

We got the idea of the "I-function" originally from thinking about Christopher Reeves, way back at the beginning of the course. It arose again in thinking about "pain", and again in connection with thinking about spastic paralysis resulting from neocortical damage. How useful is this concept? In thinking about behavior? In thinking about the nervous system? What new and relevant observations might come from our current inquiry into the input side of the nervous system?

All of these ideas support the encapsulated "I" function theory which is that the "I" function gets some information but not all sensory input. This theory could help explain why we are sometimes unaware why we feel a certain way or why we do something. At the same time, it is a little scary to think that we can be influenced to act a certain way by something that we have not experienced and are totally unaware of. It suggests that we don't actually have as much control over our bodies as we like to think we do. It also suggests that the "I" function is a small piece of the nervous system and perhaps we don't use it as much for everyday activities as I thought we did.

The Andrea Yates recent trial created a stir of controversy and put the issue of mental illness in the forefront. It cannot be denied that the murder of five children is a horrible crime which should be punished. However, I was a bit disheartened as I heard the prosecutor claim something along the lines that "mental illness should never be an excuse." Such statement simply illuminates the ignorance which our society has toward such disease.

Looking forward, I'm curious to see how analyzing the perception and use of input [stimuli] will [and will not] revise our model of output [behavior].

We got the idea of the "I-function" originally from thinking about Christopher Reeves, way back at the beginning of the course. It arose again in thinking about "pain", and again in connection with thinking about spastic paralysis resulting from neocortical damage. How useful is this concept? In thinking about behavior? In thinking about the nervous system? What new and relevant observations might come from our current inquiry into the input side of the nervous system?

Another question I have concerns how individual minds experience things differently and in the same way. For example, we can all agree that sugar tastes sweet. On the other hand, a glass with water in it can be seen as half full or half empty. I'm not talking merely about semantics, but about how people see things. In particular, I wonder what determines sensory focus. In class we talked about the extent to which people experience motion sickness. We said that the fact that some people experience motion sickness and others do not can be explained in terms of an individual's sensitivity to mismatch between expected and actual input. It seems to me that this is another instance that illustrates that there is something beyond the brain (however small it may be). More specifically, one's ability to tolerate mismatch is determined in part by previous experience and genetics.

In addition, how does our model account for the conscious and unconscious alteration of the ability to tolerate levels of mismatch? In particular, certain senses can be refined in response to specific circumstances. Alteration is also clearly exhibited by individuals who have lost the ability to use one of their senses.

The "I-Function" seems to be useful in explaining behavior. However, so many behaviors are very complex. It can allow certain instances of behavior to be explained that might otherwise not have. Do we really have conscious control over our actions or are we just a bundle of neurons firing certain patterns that results in our behavior? Are all our actions/decisions really on the conscious level? We would want to think that we make conscious decisions. It just sounds safer. To me it seems as if the "I-Function" has to change with experience. Do all species have an "I-Function"? Can we even show that they have an "I-Function"? It is important to look closely at involuntary and voluntary functions. But to me it still seems hard to look at how exactly we can control and examine the "I-Function"? If we look at people who can't move their legs, they are still exhibiting some form of behavior. Aren't they? They know they can't move their leg—which shows that somewhere there aren't connections taking place. Some people are more sensitive to pain than others—is that a result of their "I-Function"? Do our "I-functions" really make us the people who we are? Is the "I-function" making our final decisions?

I have a particular interest in the biofeedback method of pain treatment. Biofeedback is simply a tool that allows an individual to become conscious of, and control, certain physiological processes. All three levels of the nervous system are targeted: the voluntary, autonomic, and sympathetic. Studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of such treatment when used in concert with other medical treatments, and when used as the only method of treatment.

In reading about biofeedback, one of the most compelling statements to jump out at me explained that chronic pain can "rewire" the nervous system to become more pain sensitive. This was used to promote the utility of biofeedback, but I thought it held particular relevence to our discussions.

We have discussed how the nervous system affects the individual, either with or without reaching the I-function. And we considered pain in the context that a mismatch occurs. However, how does prolonged mismatch reroute the nervous system into becoming more sensitive? And how can biofeedback alter these patterns of mismatch? In a scientific context, does biofeedback prove that the I-function can indeed alter the body? Does this support mind-over-matter to a greater degree than we previously acknowledged?

There are many different factors that seem to attribute to the list of symptoms that are generally thought of as schizopphrenia. Genetics, in utero viruses, even the number of children in a household and whether the family owns a cat has been linked to increasing the prevalence of schizophrenia. There are many subtypes of schizophrenia, but the major reason that the positive symptoms of delusions and hallucinations are thought to be an excess of the neurotransmitter dopamine. These positive symptoms are actually due to over stimulation to the environment.

It amazes me how most movements can be either voluntary or involuntary. Previously I thought all movement to be either/or. It also never occurred to me that the brain works by inhibition. I now understand how Christopher Reeve's paralysis can work the way it does. His I-function controls his voluntary movement, and thus because of the damage, he is unable to voluntary move. However, involuntary movement is not under the control of the I-function and thus because the damage does not affect this region, he can react without being aware. My question about this is, if the presence of a motor cortex correlates with the capability to make voluntary movements, then does that mean the I-function is located in the motor cortex? Also, because the motor cortex inhibits other parts of the brain, I wonder if animals lacking one have any other way of inhibiting behaviors. How can we be sure that a frog does not have another way of making voluntary movements?

Have you ever seen Dr. Phil on the Oprah Winfrey show? In one episode Dr. Phil attempts to enlighten a woman on why she is persistently behaving a certain way. He keeps harping on the point that her behavior is obviously "doing" something for her otherwise she would not be continually engaging in it. He asks if she would go stick her hand in a blender, and she obviously responds "no." He argues that she wouldn't do so simply because sticking your hand in a blender just really doesn't work out for you. How does this idea of behavior – that it is ultimately driven to an end and directed to achieving something (a feeling, sensation, or other result) relate to the idea of the I-function? To what degree does the I-function simply serve to modify and alter behavior patterns that already exist? Humans are obviously not robots, but how much of human behavior is truly volitional? How do we go about drawing the boundaries?

Does that mean that because pain is a mismatch of interpretation of incoming signals that this new rewiring of the spinal cord is somehow rewired wrong (for lack of a better word)?

And what about studies that have shown correlation about babies, who are delivered by forceps, have a tendency towards bad behaviors .ie quick to become angry or violent? What role does the "I" function play?

I also am interested in the comment on Dr Phil and his idea that people will only behave in a manner that is beneficial to themselves. If a person has a repeated pattern of behavior, is it necessarily a pattern that "work for them?" To me it seems that this is only true is the behavior involves the I-function. If the person is consciously performing the same behavior again and again, it is probably beneficial for them at least in some way.

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