March 29, 2016 - 14:27
I was most intrigued and engaged by the Siebers piece from Disability Aesthetics. He talks about the reinterpretation of the history of art and aesthetics through the lens of disability. He recognizes that disability has been present in art history all along, though idyllic bodily form and perfect materiality has been prized for most of history. Art practices, especially modern and contemporary art practices, often engage with materiality and embodiment in different ways though. The materials used become more visible and the body more tangible. Traditionally, though--and paradoxically--the body of the viewer has been absented from high art. Defecation, hunger, sexual desire, fatigue, sore feet...just to name a few...are not given room. Just the eyes and the mind are recognized and valued as ways to experience art. We consume art with our appreciation of fine taste or intellectual achievement. We never consume food. I think mainly of conceptual and minimalist art here--that kind of art which primarily engages our bodies as the materialization of intellectual mind. The idea that an art piece experiements with becomes more artful or more difficult to produce than the material art piece in some cases, though the abstract idea and the material manifestation are ideally inextricably related..
This gets me to Judith Scott. As an artist with an intellectual disability--specifically down syndrome--creating work that mimics (in style and execution) conceptual and even minimalist sculpture, what expectations can we have for engaging with and 'understanding' her art? Siebers comments on the claims made against Scott's work on the basis of lack of conscious intention:
"We still assume that creativity is an expression of inspiration and autonomy, just as we assume that aesthetic technique is a form of brilliance always at the artist's disposal. intelligence, however, is fraught with difficulties as a measure of aesthetic quality, and intention in particular has long been condemned as an obsolete tool for interpreting works of art. Artists do not control--nor should they--the meaning of their works, and intentions are doubtful as a standard of interpretation because they are variable, often forgotten, improperly executed, inscrutable to other people, and marred by accidents in aesthetic production. If inention has uncertain value for interpretation, why should it be used to determine whether an action or object is a work of art?"
In what ways does Scott's status as an intellectually disabled artist force us as viewers to engage with the materiality of her art and our interpretation of it with and through our bodies first, and then our minds? How do our interpretations, especially in relation to art history, depend or not depend on her recognization of those intellectual connections and analyses?