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Both Keller and Harding tackle some very interesting issues in their essays, though I have trouble agreeing with some of the points they make. I agree that the natural sciences, particularly physics, are somewhat shrouded in mystery and that there is widespread belief that the knowledges "contained" by these disciplines are inaccessible to those outside of these fields. I agree that this image (and practice) of science is a problem that needs to be addressed, and I agree that social scientists may be some of the most capable people in helping to remedy this situation, but I have to say that I do not agree with these two authors when it comes to the ideas of knowability.

While I agree with Harding and Keller that modern science is the product of a long political, relgious and philosophical history, I still believe that the scientific method has value. I think it's funny that Harding says, "If bridges stand... then [scientits think] the sciences that produced them must be objective and value-free" (p. 79), as I brought up this example in my last posting. I understand the idea that we need to contextualize and maximize objectivity through multiple persepctives.... but is the fact that we can build technologies based on science as it exists a demonstration of the fact that it "works" and that we do know something?

I guess this officially makes me an ontological realist. I think we can know something about our world, and I think we can measure it. There. I said it. Math, the basis of science (in most cases), is socially influenced, says Harding (p.84). Yes, it is. Like any language, math evolved as a way to assist the description and interpretation of the world as we see it. I agree with Harding and Keller that science is not entirely objective, but not in all of the ways that they postulate. I think we need to change our language in science, and I feel there have been moves made in that area. The scientific community leaves its findding open to refutation. We refute null hypotheses rather than saying that the alternative hypothesis is true. We try to understand the limits of our measuring tools and instruments. I also like Harding's point about considering more carefully the social implications and consequences of the questions we pursue (this is much like Wertheim's article in some ways). This is a fantastic point. Science needs to become more accessible to more people, and this needs to be acheived through educational systems that touch the most people (high school, undergraduate studies).

I think I'm a little all over the place, and that's because there is so much to discuss, to talk about. I agree with a lot of what they have to say. I think science is seen as "objectively knowing" and this may be a problem, but I think it's silly to go so far as to say that science has been wrong all along to claim it really knows anything, which is where I feel like these readings went... I stick to the bridges argument. Say what you will about it. Science needs to be more inclusive - and there are so many ways to acheive that - but I guess I'm one of those "purists" who thinks that the methods themselves (the assumptions we make, the math we use) don't really need to change. I think it's especially hard for me to understand her argument about the separation of subject from study object because I am an ecologist and all I do is study how we, humanity (which sort of inevitably includes me), influence our environment. Maybe that's why I can't really get Harding.

Sorry about the length of this.