Morality, society, and the brain

I agree with Kara, that while our research shows that female mice can show empathy for another, I don’t necessarily believe that it is because they feel as though that is what they should do because it’s moral. They simply do not have the brain ‘power’ to understand if something is right or wrong. While I would still say that empathy is a part of morality, the mouse (and other animal) forms of empathy are not based on moral principles, but more likely empathy has evolved because of its adaptiveness of what an animal can learn about the environment from the other animal it is empathizing for and protect its relatives and social group. Empathy may simply be an understanding of another’s emotional state, and if that is the case, can then be modulated by the relationship of one animal to the other.

These same mice that show empathy will eat another cagemate if there isn’t enough food or water. When this happens in humans, we are quick to be disgusted by the person who ate their friend because there was no other food since we see it as immoral. Some people in this situation won’t eat their friend, but many do. While we view this as wrong, it is simply the individual attempting to survive. It seems that even in humans, when it gets down to survival vs. death, morals can go out the window and we return to a state where survival is all that matters.

It seems, from this return to a survival mode, that morality is indeed formed by our social group. Since our group tells us that it is wrong to eat another human, we don’t do it unless we are in survival mode. Even something as grotesque as this, was at some time in some cultures still seen as a normal way of life. These people were not immoral, since that is us putting our moral code on their society. Someone, however, who ate a human in the USA in modern times because he wanted to, he would be immoral. I’m actually surprised that I’m arguing this since I do feel so strongly that not killing (or eating) another human is incredibly immoral, but our discussion made me realize the constraints of morality on us through our societies.

I wanted to respond to Alex’s post—as a lot of the things she touched on are interesting to me. The idea of morality as defined by the intentions behind the act is somewhat how I look at it—but I would actually say that an action would be considered moral more in the case of doing something good just because they want to rather than due to an obligation. For example, is community service morally good if its done only because its mandatory? While an action itself may be good or bad in its own right, I think that to define the “morality” of the action we need to look at the intention behind it and that without proper intentions it is impossible to say that a person is morally right. Another example: If we kill someone out of self defense I think we would all say that this is morally okay, but if we kill someone because we wanted to I think we would all argue that the action is morally reprehensible.

 

Another thing that was interesting to me that wasn’t brought up all that much yet is the question: can there be rational thought separate from our emotional intuition? This question is incredibly hard to handle—because if the answer is no, then there is no way that we could ever figure it out because you can’t process without the lens of emotional intuition. Therefore, a more relevant question might be to wonder if there is a way to understand what our emotional intuition was telling us and then factor that in to our decision making process (which somewhat assumes we are capable of determining our emotional intuition in the first place, which is a bold claim to start out with). I think this is something that is really important that we start to do: I think as a society in general we need to question our preconceived notions of the world (as with all our neural diversity talks!) and try to parcel out what is societies influence on our decision making, what is due to our emotional intuition (and how is THAT shaped and molded by society), and then lastly how our genetic biological makeup contributes. To critically analyze all that is pretty much impossible, but I think it would definitely do the world some good if we could start to shape our emotional intuitions (and therefore our moral judgements) based on a critical analysis of the world, society, and our interaction with the two.

I think I was most interested in our discussion last week by the idea that whether or not an action is morally right or wrong depends on the intentions behind the act.  I think that in class, we talked about this in terms of the difference between someone doing a good deed because they want to versus doing it because they feel they should, or they know it’s the right thing to do.  The argument made was for the idea that this action would be considered moral if the person was acting out of a sense of obligation (the idea that it’s the right thing to do), but not if they were doing it simply because it’s something they wanted to do.  I’m not sure how I feel about this – I can imagine arguing the case in a situation where we’re talking about a good deed being done, but not in a case involving something that is considered morally wrong.  If someone committed murder but did it because they wanted to, not because they realized it was the wrong thing to do, I’m sure most people would still think that they were acting amorally.  We often talk about people in terms of their morals, and a person’s morals reflect what they do or do not do based on what they feel is right and wrong.  If you want to do something it probably feels right to you, and if you don’t want to do it it probably feels wrong, so I would argue that wanting to do something and doing it because it’s the right thing to do overlap to a very high degree.

 

Somewhat related, I was also interested by the idea that something is only amoral if it is affecting other people, and therefore what you do when you’re alone cannot be going against our moral standards.  My emotional reaction to the idea of morality is generally that the worst thing someone can do is purposely hurt another person/animal without a good cause, and therefore if what you are doing isn’t affecting other people, maybe it’s not amoral.  However, what about the case where someone cheats on a take-home test?  To me (and probably to most of us, given the honor code) this seems morally wrong, but it’s being done in private and it’s really not affecting anyone but that person (unless you’re thinking about it in terms of grading curves, but that seems like a bit of a stretch).  Can you really make the argument that this wouldn’t be amoral, or is it just another type of amorality?

Of all the different topics that have come up thus far, I’m definitely most interested in the questions about animal morality. I do think that there’s enough evidence at this point to say that some species other than our own posses the capability to act in moral ways. And yet, I still want to make the argument that animal morality is very different from human morality. I think it was Tamara that pointed out that one of the reasons we anthropomorphize is because when we describe the actions and experiences of animals we only have our own actions and experiences with which to explain them. I absolutely agree with this, but I think it highlights a need to proceed with caution when we apply terms for human experiences to animals because we can never really know that their experiences are the same as ours.

So for example, one of the recent trends in pain research is looking at empathy in animal models (if you’re interested in this talk to Alex T., Kara B., or Amelia- their thesis has to do with empathy and they know a ton more than I do about it). Mice that see other mice in pain are more susceptible to pain themselves, and this phenomenon is even stronger if the mice were cage-mates. In this way there is evidence that mice are “in tune” with the experiences of other mice. But at the same time we have always defined empathy as having a sense of introspection that comes into play, which likely is not a component of mouse empathy. In other words, the mouse isn’t sitting there thinking, “Oh no, that mouse is showing pain behavior, he must really be in pain, and I feel bad for him because I know that pain is unpleasant for me.” Mice don’t even have a sense of self, so that’s just not what’s going on with mice empathy. I’ve always felt a little uneasy with using this very human term for a mouse experience, because even though some of the aspects of the experience are the same, not all are. And that’s exactly the same point that I’ve gotten to with talking about animal morality. (Sorry that my example was so long and tangential, but if you’re interested here’s a short article about animal empathy and some brief discussion of issues with using the term empathy: http://www.the-scientist.com/news/display/23764/ )

Ok now getting back to animal morality. I would say that the two examples that Marissa and Danielle gave (punishment in primate society for behaving in a way not consistent with the society’s rules and drowning to try to save another society member in danger) do provide enough evidence (to me anyways!) that animals do behave with some sense of morality. But I think that the sense of morality with which they behave is different from our sense of morality in some ways. They may have an innate sense that they should behave in accordance with the norms of their society. And they may also behave with emotional motivations, such as trying to help another chimp in danger. But I don’t think that they have the introspective aspect of morality that humans do. The rationalization that you will have your toe bitten off if you do something that your society says you shouldn’t do is not necessarily the same as the rationalization process that goes into deciding whether or not you think abortion is okay. I’m not saying that it definitely isn’t the same, just that it isn’t necessarily the same and we should be cautious not to over extend the term morality.

It also seems to me that there’s a spectrum of the capability of morality. Almost all organisms that are capable of interacting with others of the same species also act in accordance to their species (I’m thinking of those simple organisms from hc bio 200 that all pulse together and form a little swirling pile to accomplish some goal that I can’t remember). But I don’t think that an ant that goes out and gathers food to take back to the colony, what could be argued is a moral task, has a sense of right and wrong. And I don’t think that animals that don’t have a sense of self are capable of introspective rationalization that we associate with morality. It’s interesting that as a human I’m placing humans at one end of the morality scale… But then again we’re the only species (to my knowledge at least) that is capable of discussing morality and thinking about the moral experiences of other species.

I agree with what Felicia said about one of the only things that is universal about morality is that most people have a moral code.  I think that purpose of a moral code is to govern our actions and help us choose the action that coincides with the moral code we live by.  However, the specifics of that code are very individual and although different groups adopt the same general ideas there is still always individual variation in those groups.  I think this variation is important because it makes sure that one group will not always be persecuted since the variation will allow for acceptance of everyone.  

 

I believe that morals are meant to help guide people to choose the “right” action, therefore I think it is very interesting to think about how people choose the “wrong” action.  Perhaps as one of the articles stated, people choose “wrong” when they put their own needs ahead of the group needs.  However, I think this is problematic because not all morality deals with ensuring group or self survival.  If your morals tell you to act one way and you actively choose to act another perhaps by changing you actions you are actually redefining your morals or those were never your morals to begin with.  Perhaps for this situation the morals you currently have no longer fit with your own developed sense of right and wrong so you are changing your actions and your moral beliefs will also change.  Rebecca asked if you are most moral when opposing the group, however if your morals are developed by society than are you acting immoral when you oppose social pressure?  In this case, can you do the right thing and also act immoraly?

During our conversation on Tuesday night about morality, I began to think about how individual morals can be.  How each person can have slightly different or even drastically different morals.  Maybe sometimes our morals are more similar to one another if we grew up in the same family or same town or same country?  This idea of people having their own individual morals seems to conflict with this idea of universal morality.  It makes me think that maybe there isn't one universal morality to fit all people.  Maybe there are some guiding universal principles & guidelines from which most individuals base their individual morality upon or from which most people agree on.  But, I find it hard to believe that everyone could have one universal system of morality.  

I also found the struggle or dissonance created by reasoning & emotion when thinking about morality to be an interesting one.  Once again, I think morals have to do with some reasoning and some emotion- for some people maybe the scale is more tipped with reasoning and for others maybe more emotion- but I don't think we can make a blanket statement that all morality is emotion-based or is reason-based.  

And, finally as far as morality of animals- I think it may definitely exist- but finding out if it really does I think it a difficult, and maybe impossible challenge at the current time given our current resources.  As I mentioned in class, I think we need to be careful or at least not forget that we are projecting our human words & ways & thoughts of morality onto these animals- the idea of anthropomorphism.  I personally think some animal behavior definitely makes it seem as though animals can be moral beings, but I have to stop myself and think about that is a conclusion I am drawing from their behavior.  I have no idea if the animals even know if they are moral or not- but as for now, with our current resources, projecting our own thoughts and words onto animals behavior is the best we can do- and I understand that.  But I'd like to remind everyone to always remember these are our ways and thinking we project onto them and these are simply our own human inferences- not direct evidence from the animals themselves.  And, since we have such a hard time describing, defining, and thinking about human morality, I think we should first focus on figuring out human morality before we jump to make conclusions about animal morality. 

 

   In response to the ideas of chimps and unborn children having components of morality, I believe that the idea of morality and what it means must be discussed. Does morality refer to a behavior or a specific mindset when in a specific situation? Is morality an innate motivational behavior that begins at birth or is it something that evolves from social interactions and communications? So much of how morality is viewed is through how other people influence our opinions of our own actions. Also I think different people view different situations/actions/feelings as moral. Everyone has an individual interpretation of what should be identified as being moral because each person has a moral spectrum for which they apply different situations that require a moral analysis. I think these moral spectrums start at birth and are developed, improved, and expanded upon throughout life based on social interactions. If morality begins in utero or at birth, then I think we are all born with the ability to conform to social rules that mold our views on morality. From these social interactions at birth and throughout life, our morality is every changing. If morality begins in utero then I do think that these gut intuitions, in response to the environment in utero, indicate a very important social connection starting between mother and baby, which then expands to include baby/child/adult and the universe. The connection between baby and mother, primes the baby, from the start, to respond to society, especially in terms of morality and gut feelings. These gut feelings and interactions throughout life add more to an individual’s moral spectrum. I think that chimps, like any other animal can develop morality that is based on the social and behavioral interactions among that given species. We use chimps to model our moral behaviors because they can more easily acclimate and understand our social cues as humans. This does not mean that other species do not have the ability to develop morality, the difference is that we cannot understand or relate to another species’ form of morality. In one of the readings, a chimp jumped into a moat to save his friend even though the chimp could not swim. This example shows a morality, a loyalty among the chimp family that involves self sacrifice. In the human opinion this seems ridiculous being that the chimp cannot swim and as a human we might think it more intelligent for the chimp to grab something that might help his chimp friend float or get out of the moat. This just highlights the differences in morality and the morality spectrum according to social interaction within a given species. Even if the chimp cannot swim he will attempt to save his friend because as his chimp friend, he has a moral obligation to save him. I think that morality is species specific and depends on social interactions within the given environment starting in utero.

Assuming that this comparison can be made, it seems that psychopathy might be good example of an impairment of morality from birth, while patients with damage to the frontal cortex could be a good example of acquired impairments in morality.  Psychopaths, who have no noticeable brain damage, show less activity in emotion-related areas of the brain when responding to emotional words than do controls.  Other studies have shown abnormal fear conditioning and fear-potentiated startle reflexes in psychopaths.  While I'm not aware of any studies that have looked into the heritability of psychopathy, if we continue the analogy between language and morality, it's likely that there is a strong genetic factor involved.  There have been numerous studies with ventromedial frontal cortex-damaged patients that have showed reduced skin conductance response and have performed poorly during the Iowa Gambling Task, the measure used most often in these studies.  Control subjects have an increased skin conductance response before they choose from the "bad deck" in this task, even before they know consciously that it is the wrong deck to choose from.  It's been argued that this anticipatory response is vital in making good decisions, something these patients often have difficulty with.

Hi, everyone. Thank you all for participating in a great conversation last Tuesday. Your contributions and insights enhanced my own understanding of this topic, and I was interested to hear that this topic affected the way some of your thought about other parts of NBS.

Comments outside these questions are, of course, welcome, but if you’re looking for a starting place, here are some topics to comment on:
- Comments on the public/private domains of morality and how that ties in to social cognition.
- We spent quite a bit of time discussing language and genetics. Do you think our discussion about the genetic basis of in-group language can apply to a discussion of morality? Is it a metaphor? What makes it different? What makes linguistic variance easier to talk about than moral variance across cultures?
- What is "universal morality"? Several different definitions were voiced in class...
- How far can you reduce a definition of morality and still have it mean morality? For example, chimps (ability to adopt social rules), unborn children (gut intuition in response to environment), have some components of morality. Is it sufficient to call them a moral being?
- Is action necessary for morality? (ie: Tamara's example about the disconnect between what people think/say/do)
- Are we our "most moral" when we resist social pressures around us? What role do social groups play in moral action?

Also, I invite all of you to take some of the quizzes available on www.yourmorals.com. The website is run by psychologists at the University of Virginia, and Jonathan Haidt is one of them. You must register to see your results, but all you have to provide is an email address. Once logged in, please take the “Moral Foundations Questionnaire”, the first option in the list. If you could please email me (rwoodruf@brynmawr.edu) or Ian (imorton@haverford.edu) your response to the liberal/conservative scale and the histogram generated at the end of the quiz, that would be great.